Debunking the Myth of the 'Kremlin’s Church'

On September 17, 2025, at an Atlantic Council forum, Sergei Chapnin stated, “The problem with the Russian Orthodox Church is that for ages it was the church of the empire.” He goes on to claim that, in the Moscow Patriarchate, loyalty to the state is the “main duty of the members of the official church.”

Chapnin implies that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has consistently served as an instrument of Russian state power, particularly in the context of the Ukraine conflict. Yet this wildly oversimplifies the ROC’s history, which includes long periods of conflict with the state and severe persecution.

Before we address the historical evidence, however, we must ask: who is Sergei Chapnin? A former employee of the Moscow Patriarchate, he is now Director of Communications at Fordham University’s Orthodox Christian Studies Center. His writings, such as those on “Orthodox faith with Soviet aesthetics,” consistently criticize the ROC’s leadership and its ties to the Russian government. To be fair, his critiques raise valid concerns. Yet his reading of Orthodox history—and of current Orthodox realities—is so narrow, so reductive, that it amounts to little more than propaganda.

Now, to Chapnin’s claims themselves.

The history of the ROC under the tsars shows frequent tension with the state, not unwavering support. Several tsars acted against the Church to consolidate power. Ivan IV (the Terrible) ordered the murder of St. Philip II, Metropolitan of Moscow, in 1569, after Philip publicly opposed Ivan’s violent Oprichnina policies. Peter the Great abolished the patriarchate in 1721, replacing it with the Holy Synod, a state-controlled body that reduced the Church to a government department. Catherine the Great, in 1764, confiscated Church lands, undermining its economic independence and impoverishing monasteries. Tsar Alexis I supported Patriarch Nikon’s liturgical reforms in the 1650s, but these led to the Old Believer schism, with the state persecuting those who resisted. Nicholas I imposed strict censorship on Church publications to limit its influence.

Notably, only one tsar, Nicholas II, was canonized by the ROC in 2000. Even then, Nicholas and his family were canonized as passion-bearers; their political policies were irrelevant. Likewise, earlier figures like Vladimir I and Alexander Nevsky were glorified for Christianizing Rus’ or defending the faith, not for state loyalty. If the ROC were merely a puppet of the Kremlin, shouldn’t many tsars have been canonized?

Of course, the Soviet era contradicts the idea of the ROC as an agent of Russian state power. Immediately upon seizing power, the Bolsheviks launched a campaign to destroy the Church. In 1918, Patriarch Tikhon condemned the Bolsheviks’ anti-Christian actions, declaring their violence an “open battle against Christ and His Church.” He was arrested in 1922, held under house arrest, and died in 1925, most likely poisoned. St. Benjamin of Petrograd was executed in 1922 after a staged trial for resisting the state’s seizure of Church valuables.

By the 1930s, hundreds of thousands of clergy and monastics were killed, and millions of laypeople were imprisoned or exiled. In 1937 alone, over 85,000 clergy of the Orthodox Church were shot. While some KGB operatives infiltrated the Church hierarchy after Stalin’s death, this followed the mass elimination of dissenting clergy. The Soviets didn’t “turn” the hierarchy: it murdered them—hundreds of thousands of clergymen over two generations.

Turning to the present, Patriarch Kirill’s close relationship with President Vladimir Putin is undeniable and has drawn criticism. However, their dynamic is by no means unique. Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew maintains strong ties with Western leaders and supports their foreign policy goals. For instance, just last week, during his visit to Latvia, President Edgars Rinkevics praised Bartholomew’s vocal support for Ukraine in its ongoing conflict. Bartholomew’s 2019 decision to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine aligned with U.S. efforts to counter Russian influence, earning approval from American officials. If Kirill’s political ties are problematic, Bartholomew’s should be scrutinized similarly.

Now, claiming the Ecumenical Patriarchate (EP) exists solely to advance U.S. State Department interests would dismiss the faith of approximately 6 million Orthodox Christians in EP jurisdictions worldwide, from the United States to Australia. Likewise, reducing the ROC to a Kremlin tool disregards the faith of roughly 100 million Orthodox Christians who commemorate Patriarch Kirill. It also dishonors martyrs like St. Tikhon and St. Benjamin, as well as more recent martyrs such as Fr. Alexander Men, who was likely killed in 1990 for his resistance to state ideology.

Now, this is not meant as a criticism of Pat. Bartholomew. The Orthodox are not “quietists,” much less secularists. We do not believe in a strict separation of Church and State. While both patriarchates navigate political pressures, their spiritual roles endure. Criticisms of leadership should not negate the lived experience of their faithful or the legacy of their saints.

Let’s be clear: this isn’t about “MP good, EP bad” or vice versa. My point is that Western political institutions (e.g., the Atlantic Council) use Orthodox Christians (e.g., Sergei Chapnin) to advance certain agendas. They will articulate political positions using the language of religion.

The irony, of course, is that this is precisely what Chapnin accuses Kirill of doing. By pushing these absurdly narrow, hopelessly reductive caricatures, they reduce the Church to a mere servant of the State. This is a most dangerous error. It must be identified and resisted everywhere, in all of its forms.