Will Constantinople Fall—Again?

Over the course of the last few centuries, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has repeatedly intervened in the canonical affairs of other local Orthodox churches—often to disastrous results. The most glaring is Constantinople’s validation of the communist “Living Church” in Russia. More recently, we have the Phanar’s support for the schismatic Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) and its tacit support for the persecution of the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC). 

Time and again, Constantinople justifies itself by invoking Canon 28 of the Council of Chalcedon. Promulgated in 451, this canon accorded the see of Constantinople certain prerogatives over “barbarian lands”; traditionally, this is understood to mean regions beyond the Roman Empire's civilized bounds, where missionary endeavors might require oversight. 

The Phanar grossly overestimates its own power, however, as any dispassionate reading of history and the Holy Canons will show.

I. Fallen Empire, Phantom Primacy

Let’s begin by taking a look at Canon 28 itself. It says:

For the Fathers rightly granted privileges to the throne of old Rome, because it was the royal city. And the One Hundred and Fifty most religious Bishops, actuated by the same consideration, gave equal privileges to the most holy throne of New Rome, justly judging that the city which is honoured with the Sovereignty and the Senate, and enjoys equal privileges with the old imperial Rome, should in ecclesiastical matters also be magnified as she is, and rank next after her; so that, in the Pontic, the Asian, and the Thracian dioceses, the metropolitans only and such bishops also of the Dioceses aforesaid as are among the barbarians, should be ordained by the aforesaid most holy throne of the most holy Church of Constantinople…

Constantinople was assigned these privileges because it was the imperial capital. And today? Today, the local Church of Constantinople comprises about 5,000 souls. The EP also has direct jurisdiction over about 600,000 Greeks, mostly in Crete and the Dodecanese. Today, the Phanar exists only at the mercy of the American and Turkish elites. That’s why it spends most of its time flirting with politicians in Washington and Ankara.

About 90% of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s “members” belong to the diaspora, primarily the United States. Even then, it must be pointed out that the Greek parishes in America were established by the autocephalous Church of Greece! It was the infamous Patriarch Meletios IV who brought them under the Ecumenical Patriarchate, sensing the opportunity to grow his own wealth and influence. (Incidentally, it was Meletios who validated the “Living Church” in Russia.)

The humiliation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate is a tragedy, one that all Orthodox Christians ought to lament. Yet the fact remains: The bishops granted primacy to the EP in the 5th century. It did so explicitly in response to certain geopolitical realities. Those realities have not existed—by any stretch of the imagination—for over 500 years. The bishops have allowed the EP to retain its primacy out of respect to the historic role that Constantinople played in church history. If Constantinople abuses its primacy, the Church may withdraw its consent as easily as it granted it.

To insist on an immutable hierarchy, frozen in the amber of imperial glory, ignores what  Church. Autocephalous churches have emerged through consensus and necessity—Russia in 1589, Serbia in 1920—without Constantinople's unilateral fiat. Why, then, should the diminished Phanar presume eternal precedence, as if the Holy Spirit's guidance were confined to the shores of the Bosphorus? 

The Phanar will appeal to “tradition.” And yet, as Vladimir Lossky said, tradition is simply “the life of the Holy Spirit in the Church.” The canons are subject to the Spirit; the Spirit is not subject to the canons.

II. Canons for Thee, Not for Me

To that point, we should also note the selective rigor in Constantinople’s interpretation of the canons. The Ecumenical Patriarchate clings to the broadest possible construal of Canon 28, deploying it to justify encroachments that fracture communion, as seen in the Ukrainian schism. Yet, it displays remarkable “flexibility” elsewhere, flouting canons that demand uniformity. 

Consider the prohibitions against joint prayer with those outside the Orthodox fold. Apostolic Canon 45 explicitly forbids clergy from praying with heretics, a safeguard against doctrinal dilution. Nonetheless, the Patriarchate has engaged in ecumenical liturgies and dialogues, including joint services with Roman Catholic leaders, blurring boundaries that the Fathers deemed inviolable.

Similar inconsistencies abound. Canon 2 of the First Council of Constantinople mandates that bishops confine their authority to their own dioceses, barring interference in foreign jurisdictions without invitation. Yet, in Ukraine, Constantinople bypassed the UOC, which had been granted autonomy by its mother church, the Moscow Patriarchate. Such actions that echo the very overreach Canon 2 sought to prevent. 

Likewise, the 1872 Council of Constantinople condemned phyletism, the subordination of ecclesial life to ethnic loyalties, as a heresy. The Phanar's emphasis on Hellenic heritage, however, often veers into cultural primacy, prioritizing Greek-speaking hierarchies over local traditions in diaspora communities. Recently, Abp. Elpidophoros—who will, most likely, succeed Bartholomew I on the Ecumenical Throne—stated his hope that “Greek identity remains strong” in the EP’s American archdiocese, despite the new wave of conversions to Orthodoxy.

Nor does the Patriarchate hesitate to overlook canons governing clerical discipline. Canon 15 of the First-Second Council of Constantinople (861) upholds the right of clergy to cease commemoration of a bishop who preaches heresy publicly, yet the Phanar has dismissed such concerns when its own ecumenical overtures draw accusations of Renovationism. In dialogues with Anglicans and Lutherans, for instance, it has entertained notions of intercommunion that skirt the edges of Canon 1 of the Second Council of Nicaea, which insists on the integrity of Orthodox doctrine against heterodox innovations. 

These lapses suggest a pattern. Canons are wielded as instruments of power when convenient, but set aside when they impede broader agendas, such as geopolitical alignment with Western powers, the pursuit of ecumenism, or simply raising the EP’s profile within the Orthodox Church.

III. Wanted: A First Among Equals

At some point, the Church will get fed up with the Phanar’s selective, self-serving application of the Holy Canons.

It will grow weary of seeing the Ecumenical Patriarch warmly embracing heretics and schismatics while spurning his fellow Orthodox bishops.

It will no longer allow the “primacy of love” to be used to sow division among the Orthodox faithful, at the behest of non-Christian (even anti-Christian!) regimes. 

That day is coming fast—much faster than the Phanar realizes. Constantinople must change its ways, or else prepare for a second fall.

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