Constantinople Has No Jurisdiction in Ukraine
A careful analysis of the historical record makes it abundantly clear: prior to 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarchate had always recognized Moscow’s jurisdiction over Ukraine.
The 2018 “Unification Council” in Kyiv stands as one of the most contentious events in modern Orthodox history. Of the fourteen universally recognized local Orthodox churches, eleven continue to recognize the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC). Only two have joined the Ecumenical Patriarchate in recognizing the Orthodox Church in Ukraine (OCU). The question is, how do bishops and synods choose which church to recognize? And why do the majority side with the UOC?
Broadly speaking, Constantinople’s claim to jurisdiction over Ukraine rests on their peculiar interpretation of Canon 28 of the Council of Chalcedon. We have debunked the “Barbarian Lands Theory” in a previous column.
It should also be noted, however, that the Ecumenical Patriarchate has repeatedly recognized Moscow’s jurisdiction over Ukraine.
I. Origins of the Rus’ Church
First, we should begin by considering how Moscow’s primacy in Ukraine unfolded, historically speaking.
The Muscovite and Kyivan churches both trace their origins back to the baptism of St. Vladimir in A.D. 980. This date traditionally marks the birth of the Rus’ Church. The bishops of Kyiv held primacy over the Rus’ until the 14th century.
In the earliest centuries, the ruling hierarch—the Metropolitan—usually was based in Kyiv. However, the city of Vladimir also served as the Metropolitans’ headquarters for a time. Moreover, the local church was not officially styled “Metropolis of Kyiv” but rather “Metropolis of Russia.” The head of the Russian church was occasionally styled “Metropolitan of Kyiv” by Byzantine officials but this was not an official style, as some historians claim.
The Metropolitan established his first permanent and official seat in Moscow in 1325, following the Mongol invasion. Then, in 1448, the Metropolitan of Moscow declared his church to be autocephalous (fully independent) of Constantinople. In 1589, the Metropolitan restyled himself as Patriarch of Moscow.
II. The Rise of Muscovy
The question of Ukraine’s status was officially resolved in 1686, when Patr. Joachim I of Moscow wrote to Patr. Dionysios IV of Constantinople with the following request: “Let the Metropolitan of Kiev henceforth be subordinate to the holy patriarchal Moscow throne – and, when there is a need to ordain the metropolitan in this eparchy, may he be ordained by the patriarchate in a blessed great city of Moscow.”
Patr. Dionysios granted Patr. Joachim this request, with a certain stipulation:
The most holy Eparchy of Kyiv should be subjected to the most holy patriarchal throne of the great and God-saved city Moscow, by which we mean that the Metropolitan of Kyiv should be ordained there, whenever such need arises, by His Beatitude the Patriarch of Moscow as the one elected by those in that eparchy... in order to receive from him the said act in writing, while recognizing him as his elder and presiding [hierarch], since he has been ordained by him, rather than by the ecumenical patriarch... We adopted a manner of condescension in accordance with the very old custom and granted to him such permission for reasons of oikonomia.
Nevertheless, whenever this Metropolitan of Kyiv celebrates the sacred, holy and bloodless sacrifice in this diocese, he should commemorate among the first the venerable name of the Ecumenical Patriarch as his source and authority, and as superior to all dioceses and eparchies everywhere, followed by the commemoration of the Patriarch of Moscow as his elder, without any resistance or refusal whatsoever in this, but accepting it as a reasonable and right act.
Now, how are we to interpret this document?
Today, Constantinople claims that Dionysios only granted a limited primacy. One might counter this argument by pointing out that the Ecumenical Patriarch implies that he is the “source and authority” of all local churches, being “superior to all dioceses and eparchies everywhere.”
In other words, this clause refers less to the particular relationship between Constantinople and Kyiv, and more to the Ecumenical Patriarch’s “ambitious” definition of his own primacy.
III. Early Challenges to Moscow’s Authority
The Metropolis of Kyiv functioned as an exarchate of Moscow until 1924, when Patr. Gregory VII of Constantinople granted autocephaly to the Polish Orthodox Church. Its Tomos granted to the Polish Church certain territories that had previously fallen under the Metropolis of Kyiv – and, therefore, the Russian Orthodox Church.
Moscow accused Constantinople of stealing its territory; the Ecumenical Patriarchate responded by claiming that “separation from our See of the Kyivan Metropolia and the Orthodox Metropolia of Lithuania and Poland, dependent upon it, as well as their incorporation within the Holy Muscovite Church, was accomplished contrary to canon law.”
What’s interesting is that the 1924 Tomos suggests that a separation from Constantinople and an incorporation into Moscow did occur. Whether or not this was according to canon law is, perhaps, debatable. Yet even the Ecumenical Patriarchate acknowledged that, for centuries, the Kyivan Metropolia was a full member of the Russian Orthodox Church.
It’s worth noting that most of the aforementioned territory was restored to the Metropolis of Kyiv after World War II. It’s also worth noting that the Polish Church recognizes the UOC as the sole canonical Church in Ukraine, despite this complicated history with the Moscow Patriarchate and the Metropolis of Kyiv.
IV. The Denysenko Affair
Some may feel that, to this point, Kyiv’s status remains ambiguous. It may be helpful to zero in more closely on the last thirty years or so. Specifically, we should consider how Constantinople and Moscow dealt with Ukrainian schismatics.
In 1990, the Moscow Patriarchate granted autonomy to its Kyiv exarchate, thus giving birth to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The Russian exarch, Philaret Denysenko, retained the title of Metropolitan of Kyiv, but instead functioned as primate of the autonomous UOC.
In 1992, Patr. Alexey II of Moscow deposed Denysenko for schismatic activities. Alexey then wrote to Bartholomew informing him of this decision. Bartholomew responded by affirming Alexey’s competence in this matter: “Our Holy Great Church of Christ, recognizing the full and exclusive competence of your Most Holy Russian Church in this matter, synodically accepts the decision.”
Denysenko refused to accept the decision by Moscow and established his own sect: which he dubbed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP). So, in 1997, he was anathematized by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church.
Immediately thereafter, Alexey wrote to Bartholomew of its actions. Bartholomew once again responded by affirming Alexey’s competence: “Having received notification of the mentioned decision, we informed the hierarchy of our Ecumenical Throne of it and implored them to henceforth have no ecclesial communion with the persons mentioned.”
Consider what is being said here. Not only does Constantinople acknowledge Alexey’s authority to depose the Metropolitan of Kyiv: it gives de facto recognition of Moscow’s right to reorganize the Kyiv exarchate into an autonomous, local church. This would not have been possible had Bartholomew regarded Kyiv as an exarchate of Constantinople, with Moscow serving as its regional manager.
V. Moscow and Constantinople vs. the “Autocephalists”
We should also consider the events of 1995. In that year, the Ecumenical Patriarchate organized a number of priests and bishops in the Ukrainian diaspora into an exarchate of Constantinople: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States of America (UOC-USA).
It must be noted that these diaspora clerics did not belong to the UOC. Rather, they belonged to a schismatic group calling itself the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church (UAOC). As it happens, the UAOC’s clergy never received sacramental ordination! Yet they were received as priests and bishops by Constantinople without holy orders by “economia.”
Naturally, Moscow objected, saying that Constantinople had no right to recognize priests and bishops they had excommunicated and anathematized. In response, Bartholomew wrote to Alexey explaining that, in his view, Moscow did not have jurisdiction over the Ukrainian diaspora.
However, Bartholomew went on to affirm Moscow’s jurisdiction over Ukraine itself. He also made it clear that the UOC-USA would not be allowed to commune with their old comrades in Ukraine, nor would they be allowed to agitate for Ukrainian autocephaly from Moscow. To quote Bartholomew’s own words:
The induction of the Ukrainian [diaspora] communities into the canonical order of the Orthodox Church by receiving them under the omophorion of the Ecumenical Patriarch will, we believe, finally prove to be beneficial to the relationship between the Most Holy Church of Russia and the faithful of Ukraine.
This is so because on the one hand those received were obligated to formally declare that they will not seek autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church, or even a part of it, through known methods employed by the “autocephalists” who operate in every way possible.
On the other hand, it is no longer possible for them to cooperate or to commune with schismatic Ukrainian groups which are out of communion with the Orthodox Church without bearing harm to themselves, provided the canonical principle of “one who receives communion with another who is out of communion finds oneself also out of communion” is still valid for them.
Read that twice if you need to. Bartholomew clearly states that, by granting legitimacy to the schismatics in the diaspora, Moscow will be able to strengthen its authority in Ukraine. He also acknowledges the impossibility of communication with Ukrainian clergy (i.e., clergy in Ukraine itself) whom Moscow has declared to be schismatic.
VI. Constantinople Communes with Schismatics
All of this went out the window in 2018 with the “Unification Council.” Suddenly, Constantinople no longer accepted Moscow’s excommunications. It reneged on its pledge not to support Kyivan schismatics. It abandoned its ambition to help Moscow strengthen its authority in Ukraine.
The reader will recall how, in his 1995 communication, Bartholomew articulated the principle that “one who receives communion with another who is out of communion finds oneself also out of communion.” Sadly, Constantinople itself violated this same principle. It reversed its support for the UOC and entered into communion with bishops of the UAOC and UOC-KP.
In response to this development, Moscow broke communion with Constantinople. In their formal condemnation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church wrote the following:
Entering into communion with those who deviated into schism and the more so with those who are excommunicated from the Church is tantamount to deviation into schism and is severely condemned by the canons of the Holy Church: ‘If any one of the bishops, presbyters, or deacons, or any one in the Canon shall be found communicating with excommunicated persons, let him also be excommunicated as one who brings confusion on the order of the Church’ (Council of Antioch Canon 2; Apostolic Canons 10, 11).
It’s hard to see this as anything more than an echo of Constantinople’s own position in 1995.
VII. To ‘Autocephaly’ – and Beyond
The expressed goal of the 2018 Unification Council was to bring the UOC, the UAOC, and the UOC-KP together in a single jurisdiction: the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU).
And yet, of the more than 100 UOC bishops, only two joined the OCU. The UAOC was completely absorbed into the new jurisdiction. So was the UOC-KP; however, Denysenko broke with the OCU and reestablished the “Kyiv Patriarchate” in 2019. In other words: there were three Orthodox jurisdictions in Ukraine before the Phanar intervened and there are three jurisdictions today.
I’m sure we don’t need to remind our readers of the hundreds of UOC parishes that have been seized by the Ukrainian government and handed over to the OCU. We don’t need to recall the altars that were desecrated by raiders or the churches used as staging grounds for military operations. We don’t need to recount the laymen who were beaten by police, the priests who were imprisoned without cause, or the bishops who were held in prison while being denied basic medical care.
We don’t need to remind you that, of the more than 12,000 UOC priests, only 40 have been convicted of spying for Moscow (and even then with dubious evidence). Nevertheless, these 40 have been used by the Zelenskyy regime as an excuse for banning the UOC, seizing its assets, and forcing its priests to take up arms and serve on the front lines.
Even from a nationalist perspective, the OCU doesn’t pass muster. The 2018 Tomos of Autocephaly stipulates that every single decision of the OCU may be vetoed or revised by Constantinople. Of course, this means that the OCU is autocephalous in name only. It’s a de-facto exarchate of Constantinople.
Conclusion: ‘By their fruits…’
This explains why only two local churches have officially supported the OCU: the Patriarchate of Alexandria and the Church of Greece. Taken together, these three jurisdictions comprise less than 10% of global Orthodoxy. Moreover, dozens of Greek bishops have publicly dissented from Constantinople’s intervention in Ukraine.
In other words, even those who theoretically recognize Constantinople’s authority in Ukraine feel that Bartholomew has pursued a deeply un-pastoral course of action in Ukraine. Regardless of whether his intervention in Ukraine was legal, we must ask: Was it wise, compassionate, and brotherly? Are Ukraine’s Orthodox Christians in a better place now than they were before the “Unification Council”? Did the 2018 Tomos unite the Church in Ukraine? Has it united Orthodox Christians around the world?
The answer to all of these questions is a clear and definite No.
The Lord said, “By your fruits you will know them” (Matt. 7:16). Unfortunately, the fruits of Constantinople’s intervention in Ukraine have all rotted on the vine.
